Since the middle of last year and especially after the agreements proposed by Russia to NATO the US – practically, claims for a return to spheres of influence specific to the Cold War era – weeks or days have not passed for journalists and international experts not to advance deadlines regarding the start of a new war between Russia and Ukraine.
Beyond informed opinions, the international public space has been polluted – including by so-called Russian experts/ actually, experts in using Google Translate for understanding the realities of Russia and Ukraine – insofar that we have reached the point of a real hysteria. Even in the media / social media / forums, we have gone from childish rhetoric, such as “Russian propaganda is repetitive, benign and (why not?) irrelevant”, to hilarious situations in which people regret not having learnt Russian in school (in the idea that it would have been useful in case of an invasion …).
At this moment, there seems to be no middle ground: practically every European (Western or Eastern), media institution or think tank made a bet. It will be an invasion or it will not be an invasion. The issue around the conflict in Ukraine seems to develop only in terms of a Russian invasion that will advance all the way to Kiev. Moderation, as a fair measure of analysis and evidence for nuanced approaches – as was well exemplified recently by Professor Lucian Leuștean – is, however, pretty much welcomed for the analysis of a potential armed conflict.
Last week has been dominated by a war of East-West declarations with reverberations in all media. The Ukrainian and Western statements on Russian troops stationed at the border with Ukraine were answered by so-called arguments advanced by Russian propaganda apparatus, insisting that Russia’s position is purely defensive and Ukraine is in fact preparing for war in order to recapture the Donbas.
The amalgam of international statements and reactions also contributes to the disorientation in the public space. On Saturday, through British diplomatic channels it was reported that Russia was preparing to replace Zelensky with a pro-Russian leader. It was followed by a response from Russia, that urged the West to refrain from provocative statements. In an interview with the Washington Post, Zelensky also addressed this issue, noting that a pro-Russian administration would be short-lived, since the population was not at all willing to obey a pro-Moscow puppet. At the same time, Zelensky said that the West should adopt new sanctions against Russia and not wait for an invasion. The head of the Ukrainian state mentioned that all Ukrainian citizens are ready to fight “against one of the most formidable armies in the world” and all European states will be affected by an open Russian-Ukrainian war.
What does Russia really want?
Published on December 17, 2021 on the website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the proposed Russian-American treaty contains eight short points that can be understood and summarized as follows: Russia and the US are powers of the same caliber, NATO membership will never be granted to former USSR states and Washington will make sure of that.
All are basically old themes of Russian propaganda: Russia is a great power (hence Moscow’s position on an equal footing with Washington), Russia has the right to its own sphere of influence, and NATO is led by the United States, hence the requirement that Washington does not allow the expansion of the Alliance. In fact, for Russia, NATO as an organization does not matter, since it has always been perceived it as an American puppet-institution in Europe. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov fully proves this when he says that Moscow would be satisfied with a written promise from Washington that Ukraine will never be part of NATO.
Russia’s Foreign Minister has reiterated, at least three times, what Russia wants (Lavrov’s interviews with Pervyi Kanal, Soloviov Live and Rossya Segodnia, available on mid.ru): NATO shall not advance into Eastern Europe, the need for guarantees that no nuclear weapons will be deployed on the territory of Russia’s neighboring states, there will be a return to Europe’s security architecture from 1997. A few other elements draw the attention: Vladimir Putin personally ordered that these lines will be non-negotiable; Russia insists on written guarantees (treaties) because no longer wants to be lied to by Westerners, just like when the USSR fell; Moscow is highly unhappy with what it perceives as being the perfidy of the West (“Westerners claim to interpret international law correctly, but they try to deceive us again,” “American exceptionalism is a lie”).
Russian claims are maximum, but not necessarily non-negotiable. If the ban on NATO enlargement seems to fall into the non-negotiable chapter, the Kremlin most likely knows that the Alliance cannot withdraw to its 1997 borders, since the investments made in the post-1997 member-states cannot be abandoned overnight.
It is also extremely important for Russia to sign a treaty with the United States and NATO. Putin will thus prove to the domestic and international public opinion that Russia is once more a great power. And it’s not that Russia is just saying that, but the US and NATO are admitting it, since they agreed to sign treaties when Moscow demanded. It is not just a piece of paper (although it matters a lot to Moscow, which feels lied to by the West), but is the symbolism that matter the most: 30 years after the fall of the USSR, Russia is reborn as a great power.
In addition, it is the symbolism of the end of Putin’s era: his legacy is a treaty attesting that Russia is a great power; he took over a tumultuous Russia, and during his tenure he restored its greatness. And added new territorial possessions – because, as the pro-Kremlin press has told us so far, Moscow’s zero priority is an international recognition of Crimea’s annexation and the end of sanctions regime (in fact, this desideratum is perhaps even more important than any treaty with US).
Why are we at the end of a war and not at the beginning of one?
Agitprop (agitprop). Agitation and propaganda were two tools used extensively by the Bolshevik power both during and after the Civil War. Although both have a manipulative character and there are overlapping areas between the two concepts, they are still different things. Our guiding definition is the one used used by Catherine Merrindale (Moscow Politics and The Rise of Stalin), namely agitation – referred to the indoctrination of the masses, while propaganda had a rather scientific connotation and was addressed to party members (Merrindale 1990, 142). Merrindale also points out (p. 143) that the agitators (responsible for educating the masses) were less relevant than the propagandists (responsible for educating party members), but the distinction between them was almost imperceptible, especially since the Party was a mass party (p. 159). The ideal propagandist should have been a person who knew Marxism perfectly, but was well versed in the art of communication (p. 147).
Why this short digression? To better understand what we see today on TV and social media and to understand that, apart from the internet and the improvement of manipulation techniques, the principles have remained essentially the same. We have become accustomed to assimilating any form of Russian communication with propaganda. Up to a point this is true – as we have seen in the case of agitation and propaganda. Keeping in mind that propaganda is a manipulative activity, we must note that it also provides clues and answers, as a good propagandist should have done during Bolshevism.
Russia’s real propaganda, the one that presents the guidelines (what Russia wants) is in the area of the top decision makers, think tanks and prestigious publications. It is not necessarily a lie, but an effort of persuasion, of repeated communication of ideas, desideratum, expectations. The agitation – addressed to masses unfamiliar with Russia and its interests – is found in Vkontakte, TikTok and other obscure media institutions, but extremely useful in sowing panic through misinformation. We still have overlaps today: even reputable leaders or the media can lie with a smile on their face.
What Russia’s real propaganda tells us is that the 2014 Crimean War never ended. In Donbas shooting is with real bullets, not with messages and we are not talking about confrontations of ideas (this would be the idea that the agitation would like you to believe). In this logic, a Russian military incursion into Ukraine would be just another phase of an ongoing war.
It would probably be the last phase, because it would either be limited to the annexation of Donbas to Russia, or it would lead to the beginning of a new war, this time between Russia and the West. The annexation of the Donbas would most likely be an additional element of pressure on the Republic of Moldova to integrate Transnistria following a purely Russian model (after all, who would risk contradicting Russia after such a feat?).
